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Abstract: While the internationalization of Russian multinational enterprises (MNEs) has increased 
significantly since the early 2000s, this phenomenon has attracted limited attention among scholars. 
In the present paper we examine the key characteristics of Russian MNEs and use the literature on 
emerging market multinationals and Dunning’s OLI paradigm to trace Russian MNEs’ development 
from the 1990s to the present. We analyze this development, particularly in regard to ownership 
structure, location choices, entry modes, and motives to internationalize. We analyze how Russian 
MNEs have evolved into powerful entities and contributed to Russia’s modernization and integration 
into the global economy. 
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1. Introduction 
Recent literature has begun to emphasize the rise of MNEs from emerging 
economies (Pillania, 2009; Pillania & Fetscherin, 2009). Scholars call them emerging 
multinationals (Goldstein, 2007), emerging market multinational corporations (Deng, 
2012), emerging market firms ( Jormanainen & Koveshnikov, 2012) and “new” MNEs 
(Guillen & Garcia-Canal, 2009). This literature is inspired by the emergence of MNEs 
from different countries, including Spain, Portugal, South Korea, Taiwan, Brazil, 
Chile, Mexico, China, India, Russia, Turkey, Egypt, Indonesia, Thailand, United Arab 
Emirates, Nigeria, and Venezuela (Guillen & Garcia-Canal, 2009). These MNEs share 
common features, but also have distinct characteristics (Hong, Wang, & Kafouros, 
2014), internationalization strategies, and paths ( Jormanainen & Koveshnikov, 
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2012). In this article, we analyze the characteristics of Russian MNEs and trace their 
development from the1990s until the present. 
Russian MNEs have been important to Russia’s economic development and have 
facilitated its integration into the global economy. Yet they have attracted less attention 
than MNEs from other large emerging economies have (Filippov, 2011; Deng, 2012; 
Michailova, McCarthy, & Puffer, 2013). Studies of emerging economies in mainstream 
journals focus mainly on Chinese, Indian, and Latin American firms ( Jormanainen & 
Koveshnikov, 2012). 
This neglect may be attributable to Russia’s low rank on the global competitiveness 
index relative to other BRIC economies. In 2013-2014, China was in 29th place, 
followed by Brazil (56th place), India (60th place), and Russia (64th place) (Schwab, 
2013). Further, there is little business innovation in Russia, institutional development is 
relatively slow, the legal and regulatory system is inefficient, and industrial development 
continues to depend heavily on the gas and oil sectors (Kuzin, 2007; Schwab, 2013; The 
World Bank, 2013). There are, however, some positive changes in Russia (Michailova 
et al., 2013). Despite uncertainty caused by institutional change (Kaartemo, 2007; 
Rutland, 2012), Russian MNEs are likely to continue to grow and internationalize 
(Kuznetsov, 2011). More research on them and their development is therefore justified 
(Panibratov, 2010, 2012). 
When international business (IB) scholars have focused on Russian MNEs, they 
have looked primarily at Russia’s engagement in international trade (Bulatov, 1998, 
2001; Kalotay, 2005, 2008; Zashev, Vahtra, & Liuhto, 2007; Panibratov & Kalotay, 2009; 
Kalotay & Sulstarova, 2010; IMEMO, 2011). Few have examined the international 
activities of Russian MNEs (Deng, 2012; Jormanainen & Koveshnikov, 2012), so 
it is not surprising that there is little understanding of why they engage in outward 
foreign direct investment (OFDI) (Yakovlev, 2006; Vahtra, 2009; Kuznetsov, 2012). 
This article outlines and discusses issues that are important for understanding the 
internationalization strategies of Russian MNEs. We begin by outlining the theoretical 
foundation of our analysis, namely the eclectic paradigm and the literature on emerging 
MNEs. 
2. Theoretical foundation: the eclectic paradigm and the literature  
on emerging multinationals
We use the OLI paradigm, which explains MNEs’ cross-border activities, to examine 
how firms internationalize (Dunning, 2001). This paradigm proposes that for a firm 
to invest in another country, three types of advantages must exist: ownership (O), 
location (L), and internalization (I). Ownership assumes that the company needs to 
possess assets not available in the home country that it can exploit in the host country. 
Location denotes host-country specific resources that would benefit the MNE and are 
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not available in the home market. Finally, internalization occurs when a firm internalizes 
its business operations rather than outsourcing them to a third party (Dunning, 1988). 
Firms’ internationalization can also be influenced by structural and/or contextual 
variables, including the country of origin, the industry, and firm-specific factors 
(Dunning, 1981). MNEs’ may internationalize in order to seek resources, markets, 
efficiency, and strategic assets. These varied motives can influence a firm’s entry mode 
and production choice (Dunning, 1998; 1993). 
Emerging market multinationals often internationalize in order to access country-
specific advantages (Rugman, 2009), such as oil and gas in Russia, minerals in 
Brazil, and cheap labour in China and India. These country-specific resources can be 
complementary in MNEs’ ability to compete in foreign markets (Mathews, 2006). 
They might also possess firm-specific advantages that allow them to manufacture 
products at lower costs and distribute them overseas (Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc, 2008; 
Ramamurti, 2009). Further, they understand emerging market customers and can 
operate in unstable institutional environments (Ang & Michailova, 2008; Cuervo-
Cazurra & Genc, 2008; Lessard & Lucea, 2009; Ramamurti, 2009). 
MNEs usually operate in various institutional environments and must contend with 
multiple institutional logics in home and host environments (Kostova, Roth, & Dacin, 
2008; Hong et al., 2014). Institutions consist of formal rules and informal constraints 
that define the rules of the game (North, 1990; Dunning & Lundan, 2008a). The 
stability of a host country’s formal institutional environment influences the entry 
mode and ownership structure that MNEs use in a particular location (Wang, Hong, 
Kafouros, & Wright, 2012). Because emerging markets often have unstable legal and 
political environments, the entry strategies MNEs typically use in these markets differ 
from those they use in developed markets.
Informal institutions such as beliefs and norms facilitate formation of institutional 
logics within a country. In a market where the formal institutional environment is 
weak, informal institutions fill the void (Crittenden & Crittenden, 2010; Puffer & 
McCarthy, 2011). Domestic networks are often important in such settings. Some 
firms in emerging markets have privileged access to complementary local resources 
(Hennart, 2012). For instance, the Brazilian company Vale has a monopoly on Brazil 
high-grade iron ore deposits and exports (Khanna, Musacchio, & Reisen de Pinho, 
2010). In China, government restrictions on foreign ownership gave local companies 
significant advantages over foreign MNEs (Khanna & Palepu, 2006, 2010). The 
internationalization of the largest Russian telecommunication company, MTS, was 
facilitated largely by its cooperation with government officials, who had established 
connections in a number of CIS countries (Panibratov, 2010).   
Agarwal and Ramaswami (1992) identified factors that affect O, L, and I advantages 
that influence the choice of entry mode into a foreign market. To be competitive in 
a foreign market, a company must own specific assets and skills that enable it to 
compete with firms in the host country. These advantages and the entry mode choice 
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are influenced by a firm’s size, multinational experience and the ability to develop 
differentiated products. Firm size is positively correlated with the choice of the location 
and type of entry mode (Buckley & Casson, 1976; Caves & Mehra, 1986). Larger firms 
are more likely to enter a foreign market via a wholly-owned subsidiary or joint venture 
( JV) (Agarwal & Ramaswami, 1992). The level of multinational experience of a firm 
also influences this choice; firms with less such experience may find it more difficult 
to manage foreign operations and thus choose a non-investment entry mode (e.g., 
exporting or licensing). There is also evidence that high levels of product differentiation 
influence a firm to choose an entry mode that requires a higher level of control (e.g., 
solo venture, JV) (Stopford & Wells, 1972; Caves, 1982). 
Location advantages include market potential (size and growth) and investment 
risk (political and economic development, government’s FDI policies). Low market 
potential and high investment risk encourage firms to choose non-investment entry 
modes, whereas high market potential and low investment risk tend to be associated 
with investment entry modes. Agarwal and Ramaswami (1992) suggest internalization 
advantages involve contractual risk and conclude that firms are more likely to use 
exporting as an entry mode if contractual risks are low, and more likely to use a JV or a 
solo venture if contractual risks are high (Talaga, Chandran, & Phatak, 1985). 
We use the eclectic paradigm and the literature on emerging market MNEs to 
examine how Russian MNEs have internationalized, especially in regard to their motives, 
ownership and location advantages, and their entry modes. We do so for two distinct 
phases – since the 1990s and since the 2000s. Before we analyze those strategies, we 
address some definitional issues and outline some important characteristics of Russian 
MNEs.
3. Russian MNEs
3.1. Definition 
There is no consensus on what an MNE is (Shah, Yusaff, Hussain, & Hussain, 2012). 
Vernon (1971) defines an MNE as a company that has operations in at least six countries. 
According to Stopford and Wells (1972), MNEs have sales operations or production in 
at least three different countries. Dunning defines the MNE as “a corporation which 
owns and/or controls economic resources in two or more countries” (1981, p.3). We 
adopt the definition of Dowling, Liesch, Gray, and Hill who state that an MNE is “any 
business that has productive activities in two or more countries” (2009, p.21), that 
MNEs do not have to own resources in a foreign location, and that their productive 
activities may vary. 
There is also confusion about how many Russian MNEs there are. For example, the 
Institute of World Economy and International Relations identified the top 20 Russian 
MNEs based on their foreign assets (see Kuznetsov, 2012). Kalotay (2010) focused on 
MNEs’ industrial competitiveness and ownership structure. Deloitte (2008) stated that 
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as of 2008, approximately 5,000 Russian companies controlled assets abroad. Further, 
the lack of transparency and withholding of information contributes to a lack of reliable 
data about Russian MNEs (Kalotay, 2005; Liuhto & Vahtra, 2007; Deloitte, 2008). 
Because most internationalization by Russian firms is in the oil, gas, and metallurgy 
industries, most studies have focused on these sectors (Kuznetsov, 2011). For example, 
the leading Russian MNE in 2012, Gazprom, has received significant attention from 
academics and practitioners. More recently, however, Russian MNEs in the retail (X5 
Retail Group), banking (Alfabank, Sberbank, Bank of Moscow), telecommunications 
(MTS, VimpelCom),  beverage (Baltika), and tobacco (Phillip Morris Izora) industries 
have also engaged in rapid internationalization in both developed and developing 
countries (Liuhto, Pelto, & Lipponen, 2004; Liuhto & Vahtra, 2007; Vaatanen, 
Podmetina, & Pillania, 2009; Panibratov, 2010; 2012; Kalotay, 2010; Panibratov, & 
Verbá, 2011; Kuznetsov, 2011, 2012). These firms play a vital role in the development 
of Russia’s domestic and international markets. 
3.2. Specific characteristics of Russian MNEs
Russian MNEs vary across industries and regions. Deloitte (2008) identified three types 
of Russian MNEs: “big six” global players (Lukoil, Gazprom, Severstal, RUSAL, Norilsk 
Nickel and Evraz group); “second tier” multinational investors (e.g., Alrosa NLMK 
group, MMK, MTS) that do not seem to have clear strategies for foreign development; 
and regional players in the post-Soviet space (TMH, GAZ, X5 Retail group) that focus 
on post-Soviet economies. We concentrate on firms in strategic industries – oil and 
gas, telecommunications and metallurgy, but do not offer a comparative analysis of 
these industries and the companies in them. In the following subsections, we consider 
MNEs’ relationship with the Russian government, relationships between the Russian 
government and business elite and MNEs’ response to formal and informal institutional 
environment as issues particularly relevant to Russian MNEs.   
3.2.1. MNEs’ relationship with the Russian government
As mentioned earlier, most Russian MNEs are in the oil, gas, and metallurgical industries, 
which receive significant support from the Russian state. While this dependency can 
be seen as a disadvantage, it gives MNEs financial security and access to resources 
that enable them to compete internationally (Panibratov, 2010, 2014; Jormanainen & 
Koveshnikov, 2012) and to contribute to the economic development of the country 
(Yakovlev, 2006). It also helps Russian MNEs to preserve stability during financial 
crises (Panibratov, 2010), a feature that differentiates them from MNEs in developed 
economies ( Jormanainen & Koveshnikov, 2012). Networking with government 
officials can, however, be risky and can lead to expropriation if companies enter the 
political arena (Grancelli, 2012). 
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The relationship between Russian MNEs and the Russian government is symbiotic 
(Panibratov & Verbá, 2011). Government officials have often been appointed to 
management positions in Russian firms. Other enterprises have explicit, formal 
affiliations with the state. In 1989, for example, the Soviet Gas Industry and Petroleum 
Refining Ministries were re-organized and amalgamated into a single Ministry. 
Gazprom was established as the sole state company in the gas industry, and nearly 
all personnel in the Soviet ministry became managers in the new company. Gazprom 
became responsible for all enterprises directly involved in the production, refining, 
transportation, and storage of natural gas (Holtbrügge & Kreppel, 2008; Victor, 2008). 
Ties with the government remain, but the internationalization motives of the company 
and the government differ, and often result in conflicts of interest. 
Furthermore, the Russian government has always exercised some control over the 
appointment of top managers in companies of strategic importance. Before Russia 
underwent restructuring during the 1990s, federal authorities used to appoint top 
managers mainly in the oil and gas industries. Recently, however, they have done so 
for media companies, telecommunications firms, and some state-owned institutes. 
For example, in August 2012, Vladimir Putin decreed that the Kremlin has absolute 
autonomy to appoint the top managers of 12 state-owned enterprises, namely 
Kommersant (newspaper), Rosavtodor, ACB, Olimpstroi, JKH, NIC, The Kurchatov 
Institute, RIA Novosti, ITAR-TAS, Rossiiskaya Gazeta (newspaper), Golos Rosii 
(Russian Voice), Svyazinvest and Rostelecom (Butrin et al., 2012; Lenta.Ru, 2012). This 
increased state intervention is often seen as suspicious by domestic and international 
actors (Gel’man, 2011; Pastuhov, 2012). 
The role of the government in the international activities of Russian MNEs is largely 
industry-driven, and the extent of this involvement differs across industries (Panibratov, 
2014). For example, in the atomic industry, MNEs receive substantial financial and 
administrative support. The federal government retains a high level of control. It chooses 
the entry mode and selects both markets to enter and foreign partners. The government 
support and level of control provided to Russian MNEs in less strategic sectors is more 
administrative. For instance, metallurgical companies receive administrative support, 
help with negotiations, and introductions to foreign partners. The government does 
not, however, control the international activities of these firms. 
The relationships between the federal government and firms in strategic sectors 
influence the likelihood a company will internationalize. The government is highly 
skilled in directing and redirecting resources as instruments to support or constrain 
companies’ internationalization. Furthermore, the government can change the 
domestic regulatory environment, which can restrict or enhance Russian firms’ ability 
to become MNEs.    
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3.2.2. Relationships between the Russian government and business elite
In the 1990s, the development of Russian companies was dramatically affected by the 
emergence of the oligarchs. As a result of privatization, this group managed to strip 
government-owned assets in the natural resource sectors for steep discounts (Puffer 
& McCarthy, 2007; Vahtra, 2009). The Russian oligarchs were originally the most 
competent members of the nomenklatura, a group of Communist party members 
appointed to key positions in the governance system. Oligarchs were often thought of 
as the “real government,” although they did not directly affect how Russia was governed 
(Kryshtanovskaya & White, 2005). Because of Russia’s economic disintegration during 
the 1990s, a younger generation of oligarchs emerged who were not members of the 
nomenklatura. Their influence over political and economic decision-making increased 
and their relationships with the government enabled them to exercise power and use it 
in the interests of the privatized firms.
Because of the privatization of a number of state-owned enterprises in the early 
1990s and the re-election of Boris Yeltsin in 1996, the relationship between the oligarchs 
and state officials strengthened. The group of oligarchs was small: 15 wealthy magnates 
who had a very close relationship with government officials (Kryshtanovskaya & 
White, 2005) and who used these relationships to facilitate the development of their 
businesses. Some tried to engage in political activities: for example, Martin Shakkum 
and Viktor Bryntsalov ran in the presidential elections in 1991 and 1997, respectively. 
The 1998 financial crisis and devaluation of the Russian ruble led to structural 
changes in the Russian market. Because Russia’s financial sector was destroyed, the 
business elite of the early 1990s suffered significantly. By 2001, only 15% retained their 
positions (Kryshtanovskaya & White, 2005). The rest ran businesses on a much smaller 
scale. Some sought personal security overseas, and two were killed (Kryshtanovskaya 
& White, 2005). 
During the late 1990s, new businessmen emerged who were younger and 
often from provincial cities and towns. Although establishing relationships with 
government officials at all levels was important to them, they did not publicize this 
effort (Kryshtanovskaya & White, 2005). This group was not directly connected to the 
Soviet period nomenklatura, but it did have relationships with former members, which 
allowed the newly emerged firms to explore foreign markets. These businessmen do not 
necessarily have direct relations with the federal government, but build relationships 
with regional and local authorities (Gel’man, 2011), which provide them with support. 
Yakovlev refers to this as “any sort of non-financial aid, including help in making contact 
with Russian and foreign partners, assistance in getting in touch with other government 
authorities, aid in attracting investors” (2011, p.7). 
In July 2000, Putin met with the business elite and presented his new ground 
rules regarding the relationships between the government and the oligarchs. He 
emphasized that in order to achieve economic development in Russia, business and 
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government should work together (Kryshtanovskaya & White, 2005). The message was 
straightforward: the state holds the power and should be respected by businessmen. 
From 2000 to 2003, the relationship between the state and business was somewhat 
collaborative, a situation that allowed Putin to enhance his control over resources and 
weaken business leaders’ position (Gel’man, 2011). 
This relationship changed in 2003, as illustrated by the government’s attack of 
Yukos, where most of the shareholders were arrested and interrogated because of 
alleged tax evasion or embezzlement (Gidadhubli, 2003). This attack was followed by 
other controversies, such as the destruction of media businesses owned by Berezovsky 
and Gusinsky (Kryshtanovskaya & White, 2005). While most of the controversies were 
formally related to tax evasions, the government’s real intent was to show who held 
power in Russia (Sakwa, 2008). The state, by retaining some ownership of enterprises, 
particularly those in strategic sectors that were privatized, influenced and controlled 
the strategic decisions of these firms (Puffer & McCarthy, 2007). Business leaders who 
did not challenge the government and stayed out of politics have not been questioned 
and their cooperation has been rewarded. For example, Oleg Derepaska, the owner 
of RusAl, one of the leading aluminum producers in the word, was issued large state 
contracts for the manufacturing of arms (Puffer & McCarthy, 2007). Such cooperation 
can thus improve a firm’s ability to expand into new markets.   
3.2.3. MNEs’ activities as a response to formal and informal institutional environment
The Russian constitution was changed in December 1993 as a result of a conflict 
between the Parliament and Yeltsin in October 1993. The most radical economic reforms 
were carried out earlier, partly under President Gorbachev before the collapse of the 
Soviet Union and mainly by Egor Gaidar. This restructuring is known as perestroika1 
(Gel’man, 2011). Property rights, ownership regulations, and governance structures 
were transformed (Puffer & McCarthy, 2011; Gans-Morse, 2012; Marinova, Child, & 
Marinov, 2012) and this resulted in a formal institutional void, which created economic 
chaos in Russia (Puffer, McCarthy, & Boisot, 2009). The legitimacy of the legal system 
was undermined because the government could not implement the necessary reforms, 
leading to broad mistrust in formal institutions. Interestingly however, the weakening 
of the state facilitated the development and expansion of Russian MNEs (Yakovlev, 
2006; Puffer & McCarthy, 2011). As the state’s involvement in Russian MNEs’ business 
activities decreased, the oligarchs, who then owned the majority of MNEs, took the 
opportunity to explore foreign markets. 
1 Perestroika was partly initiated in 1985 by Mikhail Gorbachev, then leader of the Soviet Communist Party 
and President of the Soviet Union, to restructure the political and economic systems of the Federation 
and accelerate its modernization. Although Soviet citizens received some degree of freedom and access 
to information, the implementation of the proposed reforms failed, resulting in the disintegration of the 
Soviet Union (Reis, 1997).
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The collapse of formal institutions increased the reliance on informal institutions, 
including personal connections and networks. These have been crucial for Russia’s 
business development (Lebedeva, 2001; Michailova & Worm, 2003; Estrin & Prevezer, 
2011) and have long facilitated business interactions with foreign partners (Ledeneva, 
1998; Holtbrügge & Puck, 2009). Moreover, even the government uses informal 
institutions to enforce formal institutions such as laws and regulations (Lebedeva, 
2001). In other words, formal and informal institutions are closely intertwined 
(Chavance, 2008), with both types of institutions trying to protect their own survival 
(Gel’man, 2011; Lebedeva & Shekshnya, 2011). 
This institutional interplay influences the operations of Russian MNEs, which use 
both types of institutions to operate in an unstable environment. It also constrains 
their future development (Puffer & McCarthy, 2011). Gans-Morse (2012) analyzed 
property rights in Russia and their impact on ordinary business entities and found 
that firms are relying increasingly on lawyers and the courts rather than on informal 
organizations and criminal protection. Frye, Yakovlev, and Yasin (2009) also found that 
although some companies prefer not to use the state court in disputes with the regional 
authorities, they would do so if necessary. 
4. Russian MNEs’ temporal development: from the 1990s to the present
4.1. 1990s – privatization era 
In the 1990s, privatization fundamentally reshaped Russia’s business and institutional 
environment (Filippov, 2008; Puffer & McCarthy, 2011; Kuznetsov, 2012; Marinova 
et al., 2012; Chadee & Roxas, 2013). As we have noted, while the main purpose of 
privatization was to increase the legitimacy of the formal institutions established during 
the 1990s, it also made informal institutions stronger and enabled oligarchs to emerge 
(Puffer & McCarthy, 2011). The oligarchs further internationalized Russian MNEs. 
Although these changes increased FDI flows and accelerated modernization, Russia’s 
economic environment remained unstable (Liuhto et al., 2004; Kalotay, 2005) and 
increased the reliance on informal institutions. 
4.1.1. Ownership and location 
The oligarchs purchased state-owned assets at steep discounts and often behaved 
illegally (Vahtra, 2009; Puffer & McCarthy, 2011). For example, Mikhail Khodorkovsky 
bought a 78% share in Yukos, a company valued at $5 billion, for only $310 million. 
Yukos was later sold at auction to the state-run Rosneft in the 2000s. Boris Berezovsky 
and Roman Abramovich bought Sibneft, which was valued at $3 billion, for less than 
$100 million (Goldman, 2004). In the mid-2000s, Sibneft was acquired by Gazprom 
and restructured into a subsidiary, Gazprom Neft. Although MNEs possessed natural 
resources in the domestic market, they began to explore natural resources in foreign 
markets (Panibratov, 2012). 
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The increased uncertainty encouraged many Russian companies to establish 
overseas subsidiaries (Puffer & McCarthy, 2011) and to expand beyond the CIS and 
Eastern Europe (Liuhto et al., 2004; Kalotay, 2005). Early expansion of many Russian 
companies was often led by illegal capital flows to business entities across country 
borders (Bulatov, 1998; Liuhto & Vahtra, 2007; Vahtra, 2009; Kuznetsov, 2012). 
4.1.2. Motives to internationalize
After the Soviet Union disintegrated in 1991, the internationalization of Russian firms 
was relatively slow because these firms had to restructure in the domestic market 
before they considered expansion abroad (Filatotchev, Strange, Piesse, & Lien, 2007; 
Panibratov, 2010). For many companies, the main motivator for capital flight was to 
protect their assets and finances from the volatile domestic economic and political 
environment (Filippov, 2008). Dunning and Lundan describe such investments as 
“escape investments” (2008b, p.74). Due to poor institutional development, escape 
investments enabled Russian companies to optimize their tax situation and seek 
efficiencies (Filippov, 2008; Marinova et al., 2012). 
After they restructured, Russian MNEs began to internationalize more rapidly, 
mainly through mergers and acquisitions and greenfield investments. According to 
Dunning (1993) and Dunning and Lundan (2008b), MNEs commonly seek new 
markets first and strive to enhance their foreign operations later. In addition to seeking 
new markets, Russian MNEs generally expanded first into neighboring CIS countries 
(Panibratov, 2010) both because of their close geographic, political, and cultural 
proximity and to optimize taxes and seek efficiency (Marinova et al., 2012).  
While some foreign political actors saw this increased OFDI as a threat (Gorenburg, 
2011), internationalization allowed Russian MNEs to gain access to new markets, learn 
from and about those markets, and improve their technologies. Indeed, modernization 
of the domestic economy and Russia’s strong global presence can be partially attributed 
to this internationalization (Kuznetsov, 2012). 
4.1.3. Entry modes
The privatization in the 1990s stimulated many companies to invest abroad, mainly to 
avoid weak formal institutions at home. Some Russian companies engaged in illegal 
capital exports (Vahtra, 2009; Kuznetsov, 2012), which should be considered when 
analyzing OFDI data. In addition, JVs continued to increase in the early 1990s and 
maintained a relatively high rate of success (Fey, 1995). In the late 1990s, Russian 
MNEs established foreign subsidiaries and made cross-border acquisitions that led to 
increased international expansion and economies of scale and scope. Indeed, MNEs’ 
gradual accumulation of multinational experience led to increased engagement in JVs 
(Agarwal & Ramaswami, 1992). 
Russian MNEs’ expansion in this period was mainly in the natural resource sectors. 
For instance, 90% of Russia’s foreign assets belonged to Gazprom and Lukoil. The 
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accuracy of publicly available information has been questioned, however, due to illegal 
capital flows and the lack of transparency of Russian companies (Kalotay, 2005; Vahtra, 
2009). Russian MNEs may thus have more experience in foreign operations than these 
data suggest.    
4.2. 2000s – Russia goes global
There were important economic and political changes in Russia during the early 2000s. 
When Vladimir Putin assumed power in 2000, he pushed to accelerate the transition 
to a market economy. From 2000 to 2010, OFDI from Russia increased from US$ 20.1 
billion to US$ 369.1 billion. Even during the financial crisis, Russian MNEs continued 
to expand in strategic sectors (Filippov, 2011; OECD, 2011). Encouraged by Dmitry 
Medvedev’s speech in 2008 to “copy China” and to buy foreign assets, Russian MNEs 
in the natural resource sectors established a strong global presence (Belton, 2008; 
Filippov, 2008; 2012). 
Despite this rapid increase in international trade, Russia’s institutional environment 
remained unstable. In 2000, Putin announced that he wanted to end the oligarch era 
(BBC, 2004). The state gained even more power, but formal institutions were not 
strengthened. Moreover, informal institutions remained largely unchanged and their 
resiliency created complex tensions between various actors (Helmke & Levitsky, 2004). 
4.2.1. Ownership and location 
The internationalization of Russian companies has increased substantially in the 2000s, 
particularly in the resource-based sector (Vahtra, 2009; Kuznetsov, 2012). As the state 
has nationalized some companies (e.g., Yukos, Sibneft) that the oligarchs owned, legal 
capital flow across borders has increased. Pastuhov (2012) argues that one reason the 
state has become more involved in Russian MNEs is to control informal institutions that 
have induced many Russian companies and individuals to engage in illegal activities that 
slowed down Russia’s modernization. In short, Russian MNEs’ internationalization has 
been and continues to be heavily influenced by power struggles between the state and 
the oligarchs.
In the early 2000s, Russia’s OFDI continued to be dominated by large Russian oil 
and gas MNEs that began to internationalize rapidly (Liuhto & Vahtra, 2007). Such 
efforts were facilitated by the access to resources that these firms received from the 
government (Hennart, 2012). For instance, in 1997, the Russian government gave 
Gazprom a monopoly over the gas transportation system in exchange for Gazprom 
providing cheaper gas domestically (Paszyc, 2012). This enabled Gazprom to accelerate 
its development and gain additional considerable market power. 
In the late 2000s, MNEs from the telecommunications, food, beverage, and retail 
industries have been catching up to their counterparts in the energy sector (Panibratov, 
2012). An example is MTS, the largest mobile communications services company 
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in Russia, which established a subsidiary in Belarus in 2002. Later, MTS acquired 
the Indian telecommunication company Shyam Telelink and controlling shares of 
Uzbekistan’s Uzdunorbita. Its competitive advantage is access to networks with the 
government.   
Although most Russian MNEs continued expanding into the CIS and Europe, they 
began entering other markets, including the USA, Africa, Australia, and other parts of 
Asia Pacific (Liuhto & Vahtra, 2007; Vahtra, 2009; Panibratov, 2010, 2012). Notable 
examples include MTS’ expansion into India and Alfa Bank, which expanded to the 
UK and the US. 
4.2.2. Motives to internationalize
The integration of Russian MNEs into the global economy in the 2000s has often been 
viewed negatively (Filippov, 2008; Kuznetsov, 2012). For example, Gazprom’s expansion 
into Europe has been interpreted as an attempt to monopolize the European energy 
sector (Monaghan, 2008). However, Russian MNEs typically internationalize in order 
to enhance their global value chains (Liuhto & Vahtra, 2007; Kuznetsov, 2012). This 
development supports Dunning’s (1988) view that as MNEs gain more experience in 
their foreign activities, they engage in efficiency-seeking and asset-seeking investments. 
For example, RusAl began internationalizing by acquiring two bauxite mines in Guinea 
in the early 2000s. It did so because it could not expand into new markets unless it 
gained access to these mines (Liuhto & Vahtra, 2007; Panibratov, 2012). Nonetheless, 
the company needed to develop its production capabilities to become a global leader 
(Panibratov, 2012). Consequently, RusAl expanded its operations to new markets 
including Australia, China, Ukraine, and Italy (Liuhto & Vahtra, 2007; Panibratov, 
2012). This pattern also explains why Russian MNEs often engage in vertical FDI – 
namely to diversify their business activities, as well as to gain control in other parts of 
the value chain (Panibratov, 2010). 
4.2.3. Entry modes
After the state introduced changes that encouraged Russian companies to invest 
abroad, international expansion has increased significantly (Filippov, 2008; Kuznetsov, 
2012; Panibratov, 2012). However, although strategic partnerships increased from 29 
in 2000 to 89 in 2007, the number remains relatively small. Not surprisingly, Russian 
MNEs tend to prefer strategic alliances as an entry strategy to more sophisticated 
markets, as alliances facilitate learning and provide better access to new technologies. 
Greenfield investment has been relatively more popular among Russian MNEs than 
have mergers and acquisitions, with 156 and 121 deals respectively in 2006 (Filippov, 
2008). However, mergers and acquisitions gained popularity between 2008 and 2010. 
Most mergers and acquisitions after the 2008 crisis were in the oil and gas sector 
(Kuznetsov, 2011), which kept the total OFDI from Russia fairly stable (Panibratov, 
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2012). MNEs from other industries also contributed to the increase in acquisitions. 
For example, MTS and VimpelCom, leading companies in the telecommunications 
and mobile sectors respectively, both began to acquire foreign firms. In their initial 
internationalization efforts, they sought greater control by using investment as an entry 
mode, a strategy that goes against Agarwal and Ramaswami’s (1992) argument that 
firms with low levels of multinational experience begin expanding abroad with non-
investment entry modes. MTS aggressively sought to establish its presence in the CIS 
countries (Liuhto & Vahtra, 2007) despite the political tensions there (Panibratov, 
2010).
The performance of and market selection by Russian firms is influenced by the 
industry they operate in (Bertrand & Betschinger, 2012; Annushkina & Colonel, 2013). 
Panibratov (2010) examined entry modes of Russian MNEs in five different sectors, oil 
and gas, high tech, banking, metallurgy and telecommunication, and concluded that 
although companies have a preferred entry mode, most employ various modes. The main 
entry modes for companies in Russia’s strategic sectors are exporting, acquisitions, JVs 
and strategic partnerships. Oil and gas companies also use wholly-owned subsidiaries. 
IT and internet companies tend to begin expanding by exporting and then progress into 
strategic partnerships. Companies in the banking sector usually open subsidiaries in 
foreign markets and then engage in strategic acquisitions (Panibratov & Verbá, 2011). 
Telecommunications firms prefer acquisitions and strategic alliances, whereas the main 
entry mode of companies in the food industry is brownfield investment. In addition, 
companies from all sectors (except the military sector) chose the CIS and European 
countries as their initial foreign destinations. Although companies from the military 
sector export to approximately 44 countries, most of their sales are in India and China. 
Because of the clear differences among sectors, MNEs’ expansion should be examined 
in regard to the specificities of their respective industries.  
4.3. Behavior patterns of Russian MNEs
The internationalization of Russian MNEs over the two periods, the 1990s and 2000s, 
is characterized by several behavioral patterns. Many Russian MNEs from strategic 
sectors, particularly oil, gas and metallurgy, began expanding in the 1990s, when the 
oligarchs privatized the major MNEs. Somewhat counter-intuitively, privatization 
helped Russian MNEs internationalize because the oligarchs had the financial resources 
to facilitate their firms’ relatively rapid internationalization. During the 2000s, when the 
dispute between the government and the business elite became evident, MNEs owned 
by oligarchs have suffered, and some had to undergo major restructuring. This impact is 
particularly relevant to companies in the oil and gas and metallurgical sectors because 
Russia’s economy has long depended on these industries. It is probably because of this 
dependence that companies’ association with the government often carries a negative 
connotation in these industries. In other industries (telecommunication and nuclear 
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power, for instance), association with the government is seen as a strategic advantage 
by foreign partners; these companies are perceived to be more reliable in terms of 
payments, meeting deadlines, and quotas.  
In the 1990s numerous Russian companies possessed natural resources and human 
capital that helped them to internationalize. The motivation attributed to their expansion 
during this period was their desire to escape the unstable domestic institutional 
environment and to explore new, more stable and reliable markets abroad. During the 
2000s, Russian MNEs that already had a foreign presence continued expanding. Some 
became more aggressive during this period, especially in regard to seeking efficiency 
and controlling their value chains. This explains why Russian MNEs engaged in vertical 
integration, a behavior particularly prevalent in strategic sectors. 
The internationalization of Russian MNEs before the 1990s was largely export-
driven. JVs and wholly owned subsidiaries gained popularity, particularly in the 
metallurgical, oil, and gas industries. The MNEs have gained experience through 
collaborating with foreign partners that has enabled them to develop and enhance their 
other operations. The patterns in their entry mode in the 2000s are somewhat similar 
to the 1990s. However, in the 2000s, companies from the telecommunications industry 
became more active in acquiring foreign companies and establishing subsidiaries. 
Furthermore, in the 2000s, many Russian companies began expanding beyond the CIS 
and European regions. Other companies that began internationalizing in the 2000s, 
however, entered these markets from the outset. There are several possible reasons for 
the latter firms’ more aggressive pattern of expansion, including their association with 
other companies in the natural resource sector and their opportunities to learn from 
their predecessors’ experience with expansion. The relationships among companies in 
the domestic market are an important factor in Russian MNEs’ international expansion 
and merit further scholarly attention. 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper, we examined Russian MNEs’ development in two periods. In the 1990s, 
because of rapid privatization, the ownership of most enterprises shifted from the state 
to the oligarchs, an emerging elite business group. In the 2000s, however, the Russian 
state started taking back the ownership of some strategic companies. While the state’s 
involvement in Russian MNEs is often seen as negative and politically motivated, 
we conclude that the relationship between the state and MNEs is multifaceted, and 
largely overlooked in the IB literature. This interplay merits further theoretical and 
empirical examination. Bearing in mind the call to take context and contextualization 
in IB research more seriously (Michailova, 2011), Russian MNEs provide a platform 
for studying the appropriateness of established IB theories and frameworks in contexts 
that are different from those where these theories were developed (Michailova, 2011; 
McCarthy & Puffer, 2013). 
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Furthermore, the investigation of Russian MNEs poses several challenges. Statistical 
data about the number of MNEs in Russia or their subsidiaries abroad during the 1990s 
and 2000s are not easily available. Also, the global financial crisis of 2008-2010 slowed 
down OFDI by Russian MNEs’ in 2008. The discussion on the effects of the financial 
crisis on Russian MNEs foreign activities is, however, beyond the scope of this paper.  
Finally, Russian MNEs in telecommunications, banking, food, and beverages are 
investing more in foreign markets. IB scholars should begin to study MNEs in these 
industries to investigate whether their strategic decisions and behaviour are different 
from those in the oil and gas industries. This research would provide a more nuanced 
and detailed understanding of Russian MNEs.
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